The Impact of Housing Subsidy Cuts on the Labour Market Outcomes of Claimants : Evidence from England by Borbely, Daniel
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
     
THE IMPACT OF HOUSING SUBSIDY CUTS ON THE LABOUR MARKET 
OUTCOMES OF CLAIMANTS:  EVIDENCE FROM ENGLAND 
  
BY  
 
DANIEL BORBELY 
  
  
  
  
 NO  20-04  
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS  
UNIVERSITY OF STRATHCLYDE  
GLASGOW   
    
  
 
S TRATHCLYDE 
  
 
D ISCUSSION P APERS IN  E CONOMICS   
  
The Impact of Housing Subsidy Cuts on the Labour Market
Outcomes of Claimants: Evidence from England
Daniel Borbely∗
April 9, 2020
Abstract
Housing subsidies are aimed at helping low-income individuals afford appropriate housing,
but are costly to offer and, in the view of some experts and policy makers, reduce incentives
for claimants to participate in the labour market. This paper investigates the labour market
impacts of recent housing subsidy cuts in England that were aimed at encouraging labour market
participation and increased work effort among claimants. My identification strategy relies on
the fact that, within the time period investigated, the subsidy cuts were only implemented for
claimants renting from private landlords while claimants renting from other segments of the
rental market were unaffected. I utilise this variation in exposure to the subsidy cuts within a
difference-in-differences framework and find no evidence of a change in labour market outcomes
for those affected by subsidy cuts. My findings indicate that, at least on aggregate, the subsidy
cuts did not succeed in encouraging employment among claimants. These null findings suggest
that as a policy instrument, cuts to housing subsidies may not be effective in generating efficiency
gains through increased labour market participation or work effort.
JEL classification numbers: H31, H42, H53
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1 Introduction
Housing subsidies assist low-income households with their rent obligations to help
them afford appropriate housing. Critics note that these subsidies might depress work
incentives among claimants leading to a reduction in labour supply. Following this line
of reasoning, cuts to housing – and other in-kind – subsidies are often justified by gov-
ernments as measures to encourage work or search effort by claimants (Taylor-Gooby,
2012). In England, recent housing subsidy cuts were justified in a similar manner, the
main government objective being the creation of a ‘fair’ system where claimants are
encouraged to work in order to afford quality housing1.
Despite the common justification, economic theory yields largely ambiguous predictions
on the sign (and size) of labour supply impacts from housing subsidies (Murray, 1980;
Schone, 1992; Moffitt, 2002; Shroder, 2002). The standard neoclassical model of labour
supply predicts that housing subsidy provision will lead to a reduction in labour supply
through both substitution and income effects (Moffitt, 2002). Conversely, alternative
models predict that labour supply effects may vary depending on whether housing is
a substitute or a complement to leisure (Murray, 1980); whether housing is a comple-
ment to other consumption goods (Schone, 1992); or could even be positive if subsidies
lead to reduced housing uncertainty and allow claimants to spend more time seeking
employment (Collinson et al., 2015).
While theoretical predictions of housing subsidy effects on labour supply are ambigu-
ous, empirical evidence mostly confirms the stipulations of the neoclassical model. Re-
cent quasi-experimental studies from the U.S. find conclusive evidence that housing
subsidy provision has a negative effect on labour supply, although this effect diminishes
with time and is mostly rather small (Mills et al., 2006; Jacob and Ludwig, 2012; Carl-
1 See House of Commons, Work and Pensions Committee (2010) for an overview of the policy consul-
tation.
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son et al., 2012). In contrast, empirical evidence from outside the U.S. is inconclusive
and rather sparse (Shroder, 2010). Furthermore, the case studies in the literature tend
to focus on the effects of housing subsidy provision, and very few studies focus on the
effects of a reduction or withdrawal of subsidy entitlements from existing claimants.
More specifically, when housing subsidies are withdrawn or reduced, does this induce
claimants to increase labour supply either along the extensive (having a job) or intensive
(hours of work) margin? In this paper, I aim to answer this question through an analysis
of recent housing subsidy cuts in England.
In England, through the Housing Benefit (HB) system, housing subsidies constitute a
significant share of welfare expenditures. In the first decade of the 21st century, expen-
ditures on housing subsidies increased by 46%, with annual expenditures in 2010/11
totalling at £21.4 billion (Wilson et al., 2016). Along with a range of austerity measures
aimed at reducing the public deficit, the 2010 Coalition Government introduced sev-
eral changes to the English housing subsidy system2. Specifically, the June 2010 Budget
announced changes to the way Local Housing Allowance (LHA) rates, which deter-
mine subsidy entitlements for claimants in the private rental sector (PRS), are set3. These
changes, rolled out in 2011-12, resulted in substantial cuts to the housing subsidy entitle-
ments of PRS claimants.
The government’s justification for the LHA cuts relied on two underlying objectives.
First, they intended to curb expenditures from the housing subsidy system. Second, they
wanted to ensure that households on subsidies do not occupy more expensive housing
than low-income working families. This second objective was an attempt to induce
claimants to seek employment, and to create the means for housing through labour and
2 The reforms were rolled out UK wide, however the changes discussed in this paper concerned
the English subsidy system to the greatest extent, as devolved administrations in other parts of the UK
had some discretion over related housing policies and in some cases decided to mitigate the impacts of
housing subsidy reform. For this reason, my analysis of the recent reforms to the housing subsidy system
only concerns England.
3 Claimants in the PRS are renting accommodation from private landlords.
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not benefit income (see Wilson et al., 2016).
The LHA cuts came under significant scrutiny upon their implementation. Critics of
the new system commented on the hardships the subsidy cuts created for claimants by
reducing rent affordability leading to increased risk of eviction by landlords. A brief-
ing report released by the Shelter Foundation claimed that while the LHA cuts led to a
deterioration in housing conditions for PRS claimants, they did not lead to a noticeable
increase in employment (Shelter, 2015). There is also evidence from the academic liter-
ature that the subsidy cuts led to a substantial reduction in rent affordability (Brewer
et al., 2014). On the other hand, evidence on the reforms’ impacts on claimant mobility is
mixed (Brewer et al., 2014; Braakmann and McDonald, 2018) and no analysis to date has
focused explicitly on their effect on labour market outcomes.
My analysis draws on individual-level panel data on housing subsidy claimants in Eng-
land from the Understanding Society (US) longitudinal survey for the period 2009-2015.
The empirical strategy makes use of a panel difference-in-differences (diff-in-diff) ap-
proach that examines the effects of the subsidy cuts through a comparison, over time,
of groups affected (treated) and unaffected (control) by the policy. As the control group,
I use a cohort of social rental sector (SRS) claimants. Subsidy claimants in the control
group are renting accommodation from local authorities and housing associations (as
opposed to private landlords) and are therefore unaffected by the housing subsidy cuts.
Estimates are displayed using event-study plots, whereby the reform’s impacts can be
assessed at different points in time and long-run impacts can be estimated.
My results provide no evidence of a significant (and lasting) impact from the subsidy
cuts on labour market outcomes either along the extensive or the intensive margin. My
findings therefore provide no evidence that the government’s objective to get claimants
back to work (or even get them to seek work) was accomplished, at least not at the ag-
gregate level.
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the recent changes
to the UK housing subsidy system. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 outlines the
identification strategy. Section 5 presents and discusses the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Policy Background
In England, all individuals can apply for Housing Benefit (henceforth HB), a means-
tested subsidy that provides assistance with the rental costs of housing, as long as
claimants: 1) live in rental accommodation 2) are on a low-income or are claiming ben-
efits and 3) possess savings lower than £16,000. The amount of HB received by each
individual/household is determined as follows:
HB = min {rent, HBmax} i f Y ≤ YT or
HB = min {rent, HBmax} − 0.65
(
Y − YT
)
i f Y > YT
where HBmax is the maximum eligible housing subsidy amount, Y is household income,
and YT is the threshold income for HB eligibility. Above the threshold income, housing
subsidies are withdrawn at the taper rate of 65%, i.e. the subsidy amount is reduced
by 65 pence for every £1 increase in income. Note, that increased subsidies will lead
to higher marginal tax rates by increasing the opportunity cost of labour (and increas-
ing earnings in the absence of labour). In the UK case, due to the high taper rate (65%)
the income increases of claimants from increased work effort are ‘punished’ by a par-
ticularly high marginal tax rate. Increased housing subsidies therefore make labour
relatively ‘costly’ in comparison to leisure, inducing a substitution effect towards the
latter. Conversely, a reduction in housing subsidies should have the opposite effect: a
reduction in the opportunity cost of labour and increased incentives to provide work
effort.
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In the PRS, low-income households can access housing benefits through the Local Hous-
ing Allowance (henceforth LHA) system. The LHA system was introduced on April
7, 2008 and provides a set of rules that determine the amount of housing subsidy low-
income households are eligible to claim (see Wilson et al., 2016). The extent to which
LHA will cover rental costs is determined by the private market rent distribution in
the specific geographical area (referred to as Broad Rental Market Area); the size of the
household; and the earnings and income from other benefits claimed by household
members. Upon their introduction, LHA rates were set to cover housing costs for prop-
erties with values below the local median house price (the cheapest half of local proper-
ties). Rates were then adjusted (monthly) to reflect inflation in rents.
Starting in 2011, the UK Government introduced (as part of the Welfare Reform Act
2012) several subsidy cuts and eligibility rule changes to the LHA system:
• LHA rates were set so that they only cover the bottom 30th percentile of local rental
properties instead of the bottom 50th percentile;
• the Shared Accommodation Rate (a lower rate for claimants not living in shared
accommodation) was extended to cover a wider age group;
• LHA rates were capped;
• the £15 per week excess, the amount claimants could keep when their rent was
below the LHA rate, was removed;
• LHA rates no longer adjust to the inflation of rental costs – they are currently up-
rated in line with CPI inflation4
The introduction of the reform package was staggered: it was announced through the
June 2010 budget and rolled out starting from April 2011, however, due to transitional
4 This is important because according to analysis by Shelter (2015) rents have been rising more sharply
than LHA rates, particularly in London.
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protection periods some claimants were not rolled in until late 2012 (see Brewer et al.,
2014). Transitional protection also meant that the earliest enrolment date for existing
claimants was January 2012, and only new claimants were rolled in in the months be-
fore.
In the social rental sector (SRS), where accommodation is rented from local authorities
or housing associations, there were plans to introduce the same LHA rules as in the PRS,
but this policy was first deferred and then scrapped altogether by the UK Government
(see Wilson et al., 2016). Instead, a tax on ‘spare’ bedrooms was introduced to encourage
downsizing among claimants (Gibbons et al., 2018). This policy, often referred to as the
‘bedroom tax’, was introduced in April 2013, and constituted a small monetary ‘punish-
ment’ for households occupying properties with more rooms than they are entitled to
based on policy rules. The ‘bedroom tax’ therefore targeted a different policy base in
comparison to the LHA cuts: it only led to a subsidy cut for those in the SRS not adher-
ing to the specific subsidy eligibility rules, whereas the LHA cuts applied to all subsidy
claimants in the PRS.
The objectives of the government with the LHA cuts were related to two concerning
aspects of the housing subsidy system: its cost, and its effects on the housing and labour
markets (Tunstall et al., 2015). First, a concern was that spending on housing subsidies
constituted a large share of total welfare expenditures in the pre-reform period and yet
did not contribute to an investment in the housing stock. This was because the subsidies
were paid to PRS landlords for existing property. Second, as housing subsidies help pay
rent costs for those at low wages, they effectively subsidise low wage (labour) income.
Considering these concerns, on one hand, the government’s objective was to reduce ex-
penditures from the housing benefit system and make the system simpler. On the other
hand, they wanted to encourage labour market participation amongst claimants by pro-
viding more incentive to withdraw from benefits and seek work. As the Department for
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Work and Pensions (DWP) argued:
Providing some customers, mainly in London, with the ability to live in very high
cost rented properties makes it extremely unlikely they would ever move completely
off Housing Benefit because of the very high income levels required. Moving to
more affordable accommodation could therefore encourage households to take up
employment and move completely off benefits5.
During the consultation period, the main government justification of the subsidy cuts
was based on the assertion that housing subsidy claimants occupy more expensive hous-
ing than working individuals not in receipt of benefits. The Minister of Pensions put it
this way:
Low-income households rent at about 90% of what the Housing Benefit recipients
are renting at. So they are renting at a lower level. [...] The facts are that low-income
people who are not taking Housing Benefit are having to live in cheaper housing6.
The government argued that housing subsidy cuts were necessary to eliminate an ’un-
level’ playing field, so that subsidy recipients would not enjoy higher quality housing
than low-income working families, and would be encouraged to seek work. Some ex-
perts found this justification unsatisfactory. For example, a study by the Cambridge
Centre for Housing and Planning Research (Fenton, 2010) claimed that the LHA cuts
were likely to have no impact on the labour market activity of claimants as most subsidy
recipients who were able to work were already in employment before the reforms. The
author also claimed that the reason unemployment levels were high in some areas was
due to structural weaknesses in regional economies, and not due to individuals’ lack of
willingness to work. Qualitative assessment of the recent reform by Shelter (2015) also
5 See House of Commons, Work and Pensions Committee (2010).
6 See House of Commons, Work and Pensions Committee (2010).
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found that it had no noticeable impact on the labour market activity of claimants. Later
sections of this paper will aim to identify these labour market impacts empirically.
3 Data
To assess the labour supply impacts of recent PRS housing subsidy cuts in England, I
use data on housing benefit claimants from the Understanding Society (US) survey, cov-
ering the time period 2009 to 2015. The short sample period is due to the fact that the US
survey only started in 2009. The US survey, also known as the UK Household Longitudi-
nal Study (UKHLS), is a longitudinal survey of 40,000 UK households. In Petersen et al.
(2013), the respondents surveyed in the General Population Survey (which includes
most of the households surveyed in US) were found to be representative of the census
population at the neighbourhood level.
The data can be described as an unbalanced panel where individuals are observed in
waves (these need not overlap with years)7. I use data from the first six waves of the US
survey. Some individuals are not measured in consecutive waves. I track individuals
using the cross-wave person identifier (‘pidp’). Adult individuals that share the same
household all receive claimant status even if only one of them is indicated as a housing
subsidy claimant – whilst from an administrative point of view only one person claims
the subsidies, those accrue to the entire household. Under these circumstances, house-
hold outcomes are considered, with two individuals forming a benefit unit. When a
single person occupies a household, she is the only benefit unit. The sample includes
7 The panel is unbalanced due to attrition present in the US survey. For example, in the extended
sample there is a total of 10,536 observations for 2,734 individuals and 6 waves of the US survey (see
Table 1, Appendix A). This indicates that in this sample, a specific individual is surveyed approximately
3.85 times in 6 waves. It is therefore possible that individuals are only measured once or twice in the
period before or after the policy change. This is a limitation because ideally, the entire time path for the
outcome variables should be observable for all individuals so that aggregate level information would
reflect annual data on the entire sample.
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housing subsidy claimants from the rental market, and only from England. I exclude
SRS tenants with a ‘spare room’ so that the impacts of the ‘bedroom tax’ (introduced in
2013) do not bias the estimates (see Section 4 below). Overall, the sample contains 10,536
claimants, 31.4% of whom resided in the PRS before the reform and the remaining 68.6%
resided in the SRS. Summary statistics on key variables are provided in Appendix A.
4 Identification Strategy
In this section, I use individual level panel data from the Understanding Society (US)
longitudinal survey to examine the extent to which the LHA cuts impacted the labour
market outcomes of housing subsidy claimants living in England.
I estimate the impacts of the housing subsidy cuts using a panel difference-in-differences
(diff-in-diff) model. This approach compares changes in outcomes for private rental sec-
tor (PRS) claimants to changes in outcomes for social rental sector (SRS) claimants, over
time. The model is an extension of the specification in Braakmann and McDonald (2018),
who estimate the impact of LHA cuts on mobility outcomes. The baseline specification
takes the following form:
yit = α0 + θi + θt + θw + θrt +
7∑
ρ=1
γρ ∗ Tρ ∗ PRS i +
∑
Z
′
i ∗ Tp + it (1)
where:
• yit are indicators of labour market outcomes (for individual ‘i’ at time ‘t’) from the
US survey, namely: 1) whether an individual is employed full-time; 2) whether
an individual is employed part-time; 3) whether an individual participates in the
labour market either by working or by actively looking for work; 4) whether an
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individual is unemployed; 5) the (log) hours of work by those in employment; 6)
whether an individual would like to work or not and; 7) whether an individual has
a second job or not;
• θi, θt , θw, θrt are individual, month-year, wave, and region-year fixed effects, re-
spectively;
• PRS i is an indicator of whether a claimant is in the PRS just before the reforms –
this dummy indicates exposure to the reform;
• Tρ are dummies for each specific sample year where ρ = [2009, 2010, . . . , 2015];
• γρ are the coefficients of interest – they aim to estimate the extent to which out-
comes were impacted by the LHA cuts in a given year ρ;
• γρ is estimated for each year ρ;
• The term ∑Z′i ∗ Tρ includes individual specific control variables (measured each
year) interacted with the treatment period;
To control for the impact of time-fixed individual characteristics on labour market out-
comes, I include individual fixed effects. I also include month-year fixed effects to con-
trol for cyclical fluctuations in outcomes; wave fixed effects to account for survey wave
specific trends and shocks; and region-year fixed effects to control for unobservable
time-varying changes at the regional level. Standard errors are clustered at the individ-
ual level to account for within-individual correlation of error terms over time.
The sample is restricted to individuals and members of households who claimed hous-
ing benefits in the pre-reform (before 2012) period in the social (SRS) or private rental
sectors (PRS). The LHA cuts only applied to those renting from the PRS, claimants from
the PRS therefore constitute the treatment group: the group ‘treated’ with the policy
change. SRS claimants are untreated by the reform and are therefore included in the
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control group8. The identifying assumption of the diff-in-diff estimation is that, in the
absence of the LHA cuts, PRS claimants and SRS claimants would have followed par-
allel trends in outcome variables (see Angrist and Pischke, 2008). If trends in outcomes
change between the two groups after the LHA cuts, I associate these changes with the
housing subsidy reductions. I test this assumption using event study plots later in this
paper.
A concern related to my identification strategy is that of endogenous selection into (or
out of) the treatment group, due to, for example, individuals moving out of the PRS in
response to the reform. Moreover, labour market responses to the reform, which partly
determine claimant status, could also remove individuals from the treatment group
putting a downward bias on estimates of labour market effects. To address this, I fix the
selection into treatment and control groups in the pre-reform period.
Summary statistics for the treatment and control groups, before the reform, can be found
in Table 1. The table summarises mean values for relevant covariates and outcome
variables in the pre-announcement period. Balancing tests are also carried out to see
whether there are significant pre-treatment differences in some variables. I include other
sources of benefit income (for example jobseeker’s allowance or employment support
allowance) as potential covariates to control for the impact of changes in other benefits
on outcomes (see Braakmann and McDonald, 2018).
In general, the pre-treatment differences between the treatment and control groups ob-
served in Table 1 are not a threat to the diff-in-diff identification assumptions (Daw and
Hatfield, 2018). On the other hand, confounders that are correlated with both treatment
assignment and post-treatment trends in the outcome variable could lead to biased es-
8 Not all SRS claimants were untreated during the sample period due to the introduction of the
so-called ‘bedroom tax’, which applied to SRS claimants with a ‘spare room’ as of April 2013 (see Gib-
bons et al., 2018). So that the impact of the bedroom tax does not interfere with the results, individu-
als/households eligible for this tax are dropped from the sample (it is possible to identify these claimants
based on the policy criteria).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics – Before LHA Reform Announcement
Variable Treatment Control Difference-in-means (t-test)
Covariates
Age 38.84 45.53 6.69***
% student 0.03 0.03 0.00
Children in HH 1.13 0.88 -0.27***
Female 0.66 0.67 0.01
JSA 0.14 0.16 0.01*
ESA 0.02 0.01 0.00
CA 0.03 0.04 0.01*
IBA 0.08 0.14 0.06***
Outcomes
% would like a job 0.22 0.25 0.03
% full-time 0.12 0.05 -0.07***
% part-time 0.17 0.08 -0.08***
% unemployed 0.24 0.23 -0.01
% participating 0.53 0.34 -0.18***
% having a second job 0.02 0.01 -0.01**
Hours worked 24.74 21.41 -3.33***
Observations 897 2,290
Notes: JSA stands for jobseeker’s allowance, ESA is employment support allowance, CA is carer’s
allowance and IBA is incapacity benefit allowance.
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timates. For example, the SRS control group is on average older in comparison to the
treatment group (see Table 1). If age specific trends in outcomes coincide with the LHA
cuts, the impact of this would be likely (wrongly) contributed to the policy change. To
control for this, a common suggestion in the diff-in-diff literature is to interact covari-
ates with the treatment period (see for example Kahn-Lang and Lang, 2019). I do this by
picking the covariates that significantly differ between the treatment and control groups
(see Table 1) and interacting them with the time indicators (Tp) in the estimations9. In
the empirical model, the covariates used are age, number of children, and a dummy in-
dicating whether the claimant is a recipient of incapacity benefit allowance (IBA). All
other possible controls are fixed over time and their effects on the outcome variables
should be captured by the individual fixed effects (see Gibbons et al., 2018).
Another important assumption for identification is that, in comparison to the control
group, the LHA cuts have resulted in an ‘effective’ housing subsidy cut for the treatment
group. In the presence of rent adjustments, rent affordability might not decline even
after a reduction in housing subsidies, prompting no change in individual/household
outcomes (see Brewer et al., 2014). To statistically assess whether the LHA reforms can
be associated with an effective housing subsidy cut for the treatment group, I estimate
Equation 1 using the share of rent covered by housing subsidies (subsidy coverage) as
the outcome variable. Point estimates corresponding to different sample year ‘treatment’
effects are plotted in Figure 1. The negative coefficients shown after the LHA reform roll-
out are indicative of an overall negative impact of the cuts on housing subsidy coverage
in the PRS (relative to the SRS). Significant point estimates of -0.064 (for 2013) and -0.059
(for 2015) indicate that for these two years, the LHA cuts have led to (on average) a
roughly 6 percentage point decrease in housing subsidy coverage for claimants in the
PRS.
9 I estimated various versions of the empirical model including/excluding interaction terms with
control variables. Results are robust to the set of covariates used.
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Figure 1: Housing subsidy coverage of rents - event study plot to test impact of LHA cuts on
PRS claimants
Notes: Confidence intervals are drawn for 95% confidence – significance at the 5% level
is indicated for each coefficient by the vertical bars (confidence intervals) not spanning
zero.
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Similarly to the results presented in Figure 1, in the following I employ an event study
design to identify the labour market effects of the subsidy cuts. In this, I estimate ‘treat-
ment’ effects (γp ∗ Tp ∗ PRS i in equation Equation 1) for each year of the sample and then
plot the corresponding point estimates. Using the event study design, it is possible to
track how each of the reform stages affected the outcome variables:
• Assuming no anticipation effects, the first three years are placebo treatments: since
no actual change to the LHA system takes place, large and significant coefficients
indicate diverging trends between treatment and control groups. The pre-reform
period is therefore used to evaluate the parallel trends assumption: that values
for the outcome variables would have followed parallel trends in the absence of a
treatment (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). If we find diverging trends pre-reform, we
cannot validate the parallel trends assumption10.
• All subsequent years correspond to point estimates of treatment effects in all subse-
quent post-reform periods.
I use the event study plots in Panels (a)-(g) of Figure 2 to assess the impact of LHA
cuts on claimants’ labour market outcomes. In the event study plots, the y-axis shows
point estimates for treatment impacts from the LHA cuts in each year of the sample. To
find evidence of a significant impact: 1) coefficients should be zero close to zero and
there shoud be no significant treatment effects in the first three years and 2) coefficients
should significantly different from zero in subsequent (post-reform) years11.
10 Naturally, this assumption concerns whether trends are parallel post-treatment – as we cannot evalu-
ate this (we do not observe the true counterfactual), we use pre-treatment trends to assess the likelihood
that the assumption is going to be valid.
11 In the event study plots, significance at the 5% level is indicated by the confidence intervals (vertical
spikes surrounding the coefficients) not spanning zero. I also present the corresponding point estimates in
Table 2 of Appendix A.
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Figure 2: Event Study Plots - Baseline
(a) Probability of being employed
full-time
(b) Probability of being employed
part-time
(c) Probability of being unem-
ployed (d) Probability of participation
(e) Hours of work (ln) (f) Would like to work
(g) Probability of having a second
job
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5 Results
The event study plots (see Figure 2) of the baseline estimates do not provide evidence
of a significant impact from the LHA cuts on any of the labour market outcomes investi-
gated. Nearly all point estimates are small and insignificant, and there is no discernible
post-reform deviation (relative to the control group) in the labour market outcomes of
PRS claimants. The only significant point estimate is found for full-time employment,
for the year 2013 – the coefficient estimate of -0.0476 indicates that the introduction of
LHA cuts in the PRS led to an on average 4.76 percentage point reduction in the proba-
bility of having a full-time job, relative to the control group. This result is not supported
by point estimates for full-time employment in other post-reform years, as these are pos-
itive but imprecisely estimated (see Figure 2). Given that all other point estimates are
small and random, it is entirely plausible that my finding for full-time employment is
a consequence of random noise and is not related to the policy change investigated. To
check for the robustness of my findings, and ensure that these are not biased by sample
selection or modelling assumptions, I perform the following sensitivity checks.
5.1 Robustness checks
To evaluate the plausible robustness of the results, I make several changes to my base-
line specification in Equation 1. More specifically, I test whether results change under:
1) a specification where disabled and/or retired individuals are excluded; 2) different
regional sample specifications; 3) a specification where I restrict the sample to include
only women; 4) and a specification where non-claimant PRS residents act as the control
group.
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5.1.1 Excluding disabled/retired individuals
The baseline sample includes subsidy claimants who are disabled or have already re-
tired from the labour market. It is possible that these individuals are unable to return
to the labour market as their personal circumstances might prohibit them from seek-
ing (and engaging in) employment, thereby putting downward bias on the estimates
of labour market impacts. I test the robustness of the results to the decision to include
disabled/retired individuals by re-estimating the diff-in-diff model using a sample that
does not include this group. Roughly 28% of the sample falls within this category, along
with nearly 20% of PRS claimants. The results are summarised in the Appendix A, Ta-
ble 3. The point estimates presented in Table 3 provide us with no credible evidence of a
change in labour market outcomes in response to the housing subsidy cuts. While I do
observe significant point estimates for full-time employment and part-time employment,
for both variables the paths of the outcome variable consistently deviate from those of
their respective control groups. For example, the positive post-reform deviations for
part-time employment are predicated upon positive pre-reform differences (albeit im-
precisely estimated) between control and treatment groups, lending no validity to the
parallel trends assumption.
5.1.2 Regional specifications
Second, the diff-in-diff model from Section 4 is estimated for different regional samples
in order to assess potential regional heterogeneity in the impacts of the subsidy cuts.
Based on previous findings in the literature, I can expect the reform’s impact to differ
between London and the rest of England (see Brewer et al., 2014). The Shelter (2015)
review of the LHA cuts also provides some evidence that London claimants were im-
pacted more severely in comparison to claimants in the rest of England. For this reason,
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I estimate Equation 1 using separate regional samples for London; and for the rest of
the England12. Results from the regional specifications are summarised in Table 4 to Ta-
ble 5 in the Appendix A. For brevity, I do not show these results on event study plots.
Nonetheless, the coefficient estimates in these tables correspond to event study point
estimates for each sample year. In line with the baseline estimates, in the regional spec-
ifications I find no evidence that the LHA cuts affected the labour market outcomes of
claimants.
5.1.3 Women only specification
The baseline estimates were based on a sample that included both male and female
claimants. According to the literature on welfare programs, women are more likely to be
the target of welfare schemes and are also more sensitive to changes in associated labour
supply incentives than men (see Meghir and Phillips, 2010 or Blundell et al., 2016). To
take this into account, I re-estimate the diff-in-diff model using a sub-sample that only
includes female claimants. Results are summarised in Table 6 of the Appendix A. The
point estimates for the women only sample are mostly small and insignificant providing
little evidence that the LHA cuts can be associated with changed labour market out-
comes for female claimants. For full-time employment we do observe an initial negative
(in 2013) and subsequent positive (in 2014) impact from the subsidy cuts. These effects
are difficult to reconcile as they nearly cancel each other out, suggesting that they are
more likely to be a consequence of random fluctuations in full-time employment levels
than a structural impact of subsidy reform. We can also observe a significant positive ef-
fect on claimants’ willingness to work in 2015, but once again this effect is not supported
by the path of the outcome variable post-reform. I conjecture that it is unlikely that it
12 As a further robustness check, we also estimate a specification where the South East region of Eng-
land, often thought to follow similar housing market trends as London, is included in the same regional
sample with London. This robustness check has no noticeable impact on the results.
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took four years for the subsidy cuts to start affecting individual work incentives, and a
more likely explanation is that this finding is a consequence of random noise.
5.1.4 Alternative control group specification
Finally, to check the robustness of the results to the choice of control group, I re-estimate
the original model using non-claimants residing in the PRS as the control group. In this
specification, outcomes are compared between PRS claimants of housing subsidies and
non-claimants, before and after the LHA cuts. Results are summarised in Table 7 of Ap-
pendix A. In Table 7, we can observe significant post-reform point estimates for both the
‘hours of work’ and ‘would like to work’ variables. Note however, that these estimates
are predicated on significantly different pre-reform trends in both cases, violating the
parallel trends assumption and lending no validity to associated findings. In the alter-
native control group specification, the parallel trends assumption is violated for four
of the seven outcome variables, indicating that the non-claimant group is not a reliable
comparison group in this case.
5.2 Discussion
The results presented in this section provide no credible evidence of an aggregate level
impact from the LHA cuts on the labour market outcomes of claimants. Indeed, the
null findings suggest that the policy was highly ineffective in its intended objective of
encouraging labour supply amongst PRS claimants of housing benefits. For most out-
comes, these null effects seem to be fairly precisely estimated, at least in the full sample
model, where even the upper limits of confidence intervals would suggest reasonably
small (between 4 and 7 percentage point) post-reform changes in labour market out-
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comes13.
So what could explain the apparent lack of labour market responses to the subsidy cuts?
One explanation is that most subsidy claimants who could (or wanted to) work were
already in employment before the reforms to the subsidy system. According to Fenton
(2010) the claimants that did not participate in the labour market before the reforms
were mostly disabled, sick, or retired. Some claimants also reside in regions where un-
employment is pervasive, and long-term structural issues in the labour market may
prohibit them from finding employment. Moreover, it is possible that claimants on out-
of-work benefits, such as income support or employment and support allowance, are
not incentivised to seek employment as doing so would lead to a withdrawal of income
from other sources (Shelter, 2015). Finally, while I do find evidence of a significant re-
duction (on average around six percentage points) in housing subsidy coverage for
this sample of claimants (see Section 4), it is unclear whether this reduction is sizeable
enough to trigger a change in aggregate level labour market behaviour. For example,
consider a household whose monthly rent is £500. Holding other things constant, for
this household my estimates of the reforms’ effect on housing subsidy coverage would
imply a roughly £30 monthly reduction in disposable income from reduced housing
subsidies. Given the high marginal tax rates for claimants who decide to take up work
(see Section 2), there might be easier ways for them to make up for this loss in dispos-
able income, for example through reduced consumption or by moving to cheaper rental
accommodation. For this reason, it is entirely plausible that similar housing subsidy
cuts would have a larger effect on labour market outcomes in tax-benefit systems where
marginal tax rates (taper rates) from taking up work are lower.
Another limitation of this study is that it does not look at responses to the LHA cuts that
may have been overlapping with, or offsetting, labour market responses. For example,
13 An exception is the hours of work outcome, where coefficients tend to be less precisely estimated,
most likely due to the low sample size of claimants who are in employment.
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if individuals moved to cheaper accommodation in response to the subsidy cuts and
managed to increase their disposable income, this likely cancelled out the need for a
substantial labour market response. Previous empirical studies on the LHA cuts find
mixed evidence of a mobility response (Brewer et al., 2014; Braakmann and McDonald,
2018). In this case, measurement issues related to the US survey render any investiga-
tion of mobility outcomes potentially misleading. This is because the variables that can
be used to indicate whether individuals moved or not in a given year are featured with
very different frequencies in different survey waves, making the construction of time
series problematic14. Nonetheless, since the explicit aim of the LHA reform was to in-
crease labour supply among claimants, the finding of a null effect for these outcomes
is important regardless of what the overlapping mobility response was. Whether the
lack of a labour supply response is a consequence of mobility responses or other factors
does not change the implication that the policy was ineffective in its main objective of
bringing claimants back to work.
Overall, my results suggest that at the margin, labour market outcomes may not be
highly dependent on changes in housing subsidies. From a policy perspective, this in-
dicates that while the government is unable to accomplish their intended objective of
bringing claimants back to work, they might force claimants, especially ones already in
severe difficulty, under more vulnerable housing conditions. Nonetheless, the present
analysis does not quantify these likely mechanisms behind the null effect observed. Con-
sequently, the only inference that I can make based on the results is that, relative to the
control group, the reforms have had no significant (and robust) aggregate level impact
on the labour market outcomes of PRS claimants.
14 These two variables are called ‘mvyr’ and ‘plnowy4’. The latter seems to be used much more often
in later survey waves, however using this variable results in a large drop in aggregate observations for
mobility in later waves.
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6 Conclusions
This paper looked at the labour supply impacts of a reform to the English housing sub-
sidy system that has led to a substantial reduction in subsidy entitlements for private
rental sector (PRS) claimants. These subsidy cuts were intended to encourage labour
market participation and increased work effort by claimants. To estimate the effects
of this policy on the labour market outcomes of claimants, I followed a difference-in-
differences approach in which I compared PRS claimants to claimants renting from the
social rental sector who were unaffected by the policy change. My findings indicate that
the reforms had no significant and robust impact on the labour market outcomes of af-
fected claimants, rendering the policy ineffective in its intended objective of bringing
claimants back to work. These null findings are robust to a number of different specifica-
tions and sensitivity checks. Nonetheless, the precise mechanisms behind my findings
are not identified in this paper, and more detailed analysis is needed to understand the
factors that drive the labour market decisions of subsidy claimants.
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A Appendix
Table 1: Summary Statistics – Baseline Sample
Variable Mean SD Count
Assignment
% PRS (pre-reform) 0.31 0.46 10,536
Covariates
Age 46.12 15.46 10,536
% student 0.02 0.14 10,536
% retired 0.20 0.40 10,536
% disabled 0.18 0.39 10,536
Children in HH 0.92 1.20 10,536
Female 0.68 0.46 10,536
JSA 0.11 0.32 10,536
ESA 0.02 0.14 10,536
CA 0.04 0.20 10,536
IBA 0.12 0.33 10,536
Outcomes
% would like a job 0.20 0.40 10,536
% full-time 0.09 0.29 10,536
% part-time 0.13 0.33 10,536
% unemployed 0.19 0.39 10,536
% participating 0.41 0.49 10,536
% having a second job 0.02 0.13 10,536
Hours worked 25.02 11.63 2,013
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Table 2: OLS Results – Baseline sample
Variables FT PT UN PR WL SJ HW
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2009 0.0110 -0.0350 0.0518 0.0337 -0.0018 0.0009 0.1620
(0.0243) (0.0271) (0.0335) (0.0341) (0.0368) (0.0115) (0.1050)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2010 0.0040 -0.0029 0.0066 0.0051 -0.0453 -0.0006 -0.0204
(0.0192) (0.0239) (0.0278) (0.0283) (0.0287) (0.0108) (0.0589)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2011 0.0050 -0.0061 0.0175 0.0166 -0.0303 0.0068 -0.0227
(0.0178) (0.0228) (0.0250) (0.0253) (0.0284) (0.0104) (0.0528)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2012 0.0324 -0.0253 0.0089 0.0150 -0.0279 0.0083 0.0051
(0.0203) (0.0213) (0.0248) (0.0257) (0.0277) (0.0116) (0.0519)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2013 -0.0476** 0.0024 0.0121 -0.0326 0.0242 -0.0051 -0.0538
(0.0209) (0.0241) (0.0279) (0.0283) (0.0318) (0.0160) (0.0560)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2014 0.0374 -0.0118 -0.0033 0.0237 0.0003 -0.0290* 0.0880
(0.0233) (0.0258) (0.0290) (0.0301) (0.0323) (0.0155) (0.0572)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2015 0.0660 -0.0789* 0.0099 -0.0045 0.0513 0.0096 0.0170
(0.0425) (0.0446) (0.0414) (0.0478) (0.0388) (0.0144) (0.0911)
Observations 10,536 10,536 10,536 10,536 10,536 10,536 2,013
R-squared 0.072 0.039 0.044 0.041 0.081 0.035 0.225
Nr. of individuals 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 716
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are shown in paren-
theses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3: OLS Results – Excluded disabled/retired sample
Variables FT PT UN PR WL SJ HW
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2009 -0.0557 0.0794 0.0186 0.0511 -0.0604 0.0125 0.139
(0.0538) (0.0600) (0.0587) (0.0601) (0.0488) (0.0198) (0.1350)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2010 -0.0718 0.110* -0.0130 0.0219 -0.108*** 0.0099 -0.0568
(0.0507) (0.0571) (0.0535) (0.0554) (0.0393) (0.0195) (0.0999)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2011 -0.0714 0.111* -0.0027 0.0374 -0.0805** 0.0133 -0.0696
(0.0507) (0.0575) (0.0533) (0.0545) (0.0404) (0.0195) (0.0978)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2012 -0.0749 0.115** -0.0234 0.0167 -0.0406 0.0047 -0.0317
(0.0510) (0.0580) (0.0532) (0.0542) (0.0405) (0.0189) (0.0927)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2013 -0.0436 0.0837 -0.0317 0.0084 -0.0732* 0.0185 -0.0452
(0.0512) (0.0563) (0.0508) (0.0532) (0.0411) (0.0201) (0.0930)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2014 -0.109** 0.0928 -0.0044 -0.0192 -0.0404 0.0158 -0.105
(0.0506) (0.0576) (0.0533) (0.0565) (0.0412) (0.0219) (0.0892)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2015 -0.0715 0.0695 0.0070 0.0069 0.0628 0.0191 0.0181
(0.0509) (0.0542) (0.0487) (0.0546) (0.0417) (0.0180) (0.0895)
Observations 7,653 7,653 7,653 7,653 7,653 7,653 2,000
R-squared 0.091 0.052 0.061 0.070 0.081 0.049 0.231
Nr. of individuals 2,210 2,210 2,210 2,210 2,210 2,210 716
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are shown in paren-
theses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: OLS Results – London specification
Variables FT PT UN PR WL SJ HW
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2009 -0.0316 0.0111 -0.0147 -0.0369 0.0935 0.0074 -0.109
(0.0552) (0.0614) (0.0842) (0.0802) (0.0870) (0.0149) (0.150)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2010 -0.0416 -0.0001 -0.0288 -0.0717 0.0285 0.0198 -0.255*
(0.0495) (0.0553) (0.0629) (0.0592) (0.0708) (0.0182) (0.131)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2011 -0.0147 -0.0306 -0.0075 -0.0535 0.102 0.0201 -0.136
(0.0463) (0.0549) (0.0581) (0.0559) (0.0722) (0.0189) (0.148)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2012 -0.0197 -0.0065 -0.0160 -0.0426 0.0995 -0.0224 0.0307
(0.0503) (0.0465) (0.0617) (0.0618) (0.0669) (0.0137) (0.145)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2013 -0.0611 -0.0203 0.0881 0.0122 0.0205 0.0274 -0.127
(0.0475) (0.0613) (0.0724) (0.0779) (0.0852) (0.0280) (0.141)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2014 0.0361 -0.0323 -0.0439 -0.0436 -0.0958 0.0051 0.0542
(0.0568) (0.0695) (0.0727) (0.0826) (0.0846) (0.0287) (0.191)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2015 0.0796 -0.0656 -0.0140 -0.0009 0.0382 0.0284 0.173
(0.0808) (0.0842) (0.0818) (0.113) (0.0849) (0.0249) (0.251)
Observations 2,457 2,457 2,457 2,457 2,457 2,457 488
R-squared 0.107 0.084 0.087 0.076 0.115 0.081 0.446
Nr. of individuals 690 690 690 690 690 690 178
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are shown in paren-
theses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: OLS Results – Rest of England specification
Variables FT PT UN PR WL SJ HW
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2009 0.0194 -0.0432 0.0712** 0.0551 -0.0223 -0.0017 0.152
(0.0266) (0.0305) (0.0363) (0.0373) (0.0408) (0.0141) (0.129)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2010 0.0143 -0.0034 0.0182 0.0264 -0.0627** -0.0075 0.0004
(0.0207) (0.0265) (0.0309) (0.0318) (0.0315) (0.0128) (0.0680)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2011 0.0040 0.0057 0.0255 0.0356 -0.0640** 0.0027 -0.0065
(0.0189) (0.0248) (0.0276) (0.0279) (0.0308) (0.0121) (0.0530)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2012 0.0434* -0.0272 0.0188 0.0339 -0.0544* 0.0138 0.0356
(0.0221) (0.0242) (0.0266) (0.0278) (0.0304) (0.0142) (0.0580)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2013 -0.0391* 0.0094 -0.0148 -0.0449 0.0244 -0.0124 -0.0282
(0.0236) (0.0256) (0.0295) (0.0289) (0.0334) (0.0191) (0.0590)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2014 0.0266 -0.0024 0.0175 0.0425 0.0197 -0.0358* 0.0272
(0.0257) (0.0272) (0.0312) (0.0321) (0.0346) (0.0184) (0.0548)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2015 0.0700 -0.0919 0.0227 0.0005 0.0671* -0.0045 -0.0970
(0.0512) (0.0565) (0.0486) (0.0548) (0.0402) (0.0173) (0.0990)
Observations 8,079 8,079 8,079 8,079 8,079 8,079 1,525
R-squared 0.078 0.047 0.054 0.050 0.089 0.037 0.298
Nr. of individuals 2,055 2,055 2,055 2,055 2,055 2,055 539
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are shown in paren-
theses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: OLS Results – Women only specification
Variables FT PT UN PR WL SJ HW
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2009 0.0428 -0.0577 0.0262 0.0188 -0.0348 -0.0101 0.222
(0.0284) (0.0372) (0.0415) (0.0467) (0.0478) (0.0122) (0.150)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2010 0.0123 -0.0133 0.0105 0.0085 -0.0617* 0.0049 0.0151
(0.0221) (0.0325) (0.0343) (0.0376) (0.0366) (0.0124) (0.0668)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2011 0.0005 -0.0034 0.0208 0.0182 -0.0400 0.0015 -0.0465
(0.0212) (0.0301) (0.0318) (0.0350) (0.0358) (0.0115) (0.0662)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2012 0.0343 -0.0375 0.0297 0.0261 -0.0365 0.0072 -0.0295
(0.0238) (0.0289) (0.0305) (0.0335) (0.0358) (0.0151) (0.0634)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2013 -0.071*** 0.0260 -0.0181 -0.0652* 0.0019 0.0079 -0.0360
(0.0250) (0.0326) (0.0328) (0.0363) (0.0398) (0.0205) (0.0679)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2014 0.0539** -0.0226 0.0231 0.0592 0.0006 -0.0343 0.0998
(0.0272) (0.0346) (0.0358) (0.0389) (0.0403) (0.0212) (0.0655)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2015 0.0514 -0.0782 0.0330 0.0039 0.0927** -0.0020 -0.0585
(0.0576) (0.0633) (0.0496) (0.0624) (0.0452) (0.0183) (0.113)
Observations 7,164 7,164 7,164 7,164 7,164 7,164 1,468
R-squared 0.079 0.058 0.045 0.057 0.095 0.044 0.265
Nr. of individuals 1,847 1,847 1,847 1,847 1,847 1,847 519
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are shown in paren-
theses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: OLS Results – Non-claimant control group
Variables FT PT UN PR WL SJ HW
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2009 -0.183*** 0.0156 0.0648 -0.103* 0.152*** 0.0104 -0.229**
(0.0632) (0.0710) (0.0518) (0.0607) (0.0424) (0.0243) (0.0971)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2010 -0.214*** 0.0582 0.0915* -0.0622 0.0609* 0.0002 -0.271***
(0.0601) (0.0696) (0.0490) (0.0577) (0.0347) (0.0238) (0.0836)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2011 -0.193*** 0.0618 0.115** -0.0164 0.0949*** -0.0082 -0.248***
(0.0606) (0.0694) (0.0487) (0.0564) (0.0350) (0.0237) (0.0844)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2012 -0.158*** 0.0786 0.0573 -0.0190 0.0799** -0.0044 -0.185**
(0.0601) (0.0692) (0.0488) (0.0567) (0.0344) (0.0231) (0.0823)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2013 -0.120* 0.0558 0.0523 -0.00935 0.0397 0.0313 -0.169**
(0.0612) (0.0672) (0.0491) (0.0584) (0.0355) (0.0239) (0.0849)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2014 -0.130** 0.0971 0.0234 -0.0129 0.0632* 0.0285 -0.132
(0.0615) (0.0695) (0.0487) (0.0585) (0.0351) (0.0259) (0.0810)
γp ∗ PRS i ∗ 2015 -0.111* 0.0652 0.0271 -0.0184 -0.0313 0.0038 -0.138*
(0.0612) (0.0659) (0.0458) (0.0575) (0.0357) (0.0210) (0.0812)
Observations 12,039 12,039 12,039 12,039 12,039 12,039 7,319
R-squared 0.059 0.030 0.080 0.057 0.046 0.033 0.090
Nr. of individuals 3,954 3,954 3,954 3,954 3,954 3,954 2,652
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are shown in paren-
theses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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